Approved For Release 2005/04/26: CIA-RDP79R01012A000300020021-2

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

26 December 1950

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HEMORANDUM FOR:			
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- 1. Terms of reference for subject estimate are forwarded for action by the IAC agencies in accordance with discussions held with your representative on 23 December.
- 2. It is noted that on finalizing these terms of reference in the light of the discussion, it was considered desirable to separate out the possibilities of a shift in Turkey's pro-US alignment rather than to merge a consideration of this factor in other sections of the estimate. Accordingly, this has been done. (See Section III of enclosure) This need not be given any more extended discussion, however, than is necessary to explore the problem briefly.

3. It is requested that you close of business Monday, January	r contribution be forwarded by
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	Assistant Director National Estimates

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DISCUSSION

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1. Short of major Western reverses in the Near East at the hands of the USSR or a US retreat into hemispheric isolationism, Turkey will remain solidly aligned with the West. The Turks are determined to preserve the independence of Turkey and consider that alignment with the US and its allies offers Turkey its only hope of effectively resisting Soviet pressures, which since the end of World War II have been far more severe than the pressures to which Turkey was traditionally subjected by Czarist Russia. The USSR has demanded a share in control of the Straits and the right to station Soviet troops there. It has claimed the Kars plateau area in northeastern Turkey, not only because it has traditionally contested control of this area with Turkey but also because the establishment of air bases there would threaten vital areas in the USSR. Moreover, the USSR has permitted its propagandists to denounce the Turkish regime, vilify Turkish leaders, attack Turkey's close association with the US, and attempt to incite revolt against the Turkish Government. Turkey believes that this pressure constitutes so great a threat to its national security and independence that it has abandoned its traditional policy of balancing one great power against another

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and has fully aligned itself with the West.

With each cold war reverse and each isolated Soviet or satellite aggression, Turkish demands for a firm US commitment would become more insistent and ultimately would become a condition for Turkey's continued alignment with the West. The Turks expect the West to suffer further diplomatic or military reverses, but believe that the US and its allies will be able ultimately to contain Soviet imperialism or defeat the USSR in event of war. A reduction in the US power position as a result of further reverses in the cold war would not alter Turkey's basic alignment as long as the US continued to oppose Soviet imperialism. Even if the US failed to prevent Soviet occupation or control of Yugoslavia or Iran and refused to consider Soviet or satellite attacks against those countries as sufficient justification for US attacks on the USSR, Turkey would probably maintain its pro-US alignment. On the other hand, if the US failed to prevent Soviet occupation or control of Greece and refused to consider a Soviet or satellite attack on Greece sufficient justification for US declaration of war on the USSR, Turkey probably would attempt to adopt a neutralist policy in the East-West struggle.